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— FINANCIALIZING DESALINATION: Rethinking 
the Returns of Big Infrastructure
alex loftus and hug march
Abstract
Against the trend prevalent during the 1990s and 2000s, large-scale infrastructural 
projects have made a comeback in the water sector. Although sometimes framed as part of 
a broader sustainable transition, the return of big infrastructure is a much more compli-
cated story in which finance has played a crucial role. In the following article, we explore 
this encounter between finance and water infrastructure using the case of Britain’s first 
experiment in desalination technologies, the Thames Water Desalination Plant (TWDP). 
On the surface, the plant appears to be a classic example of the successes of normative 
industrial ecology, in which sustainability challenges have been met with forward-thinking 
green innovations. However, the TWDP is utterly dependent on a byzantine financial 
model, which has shaped Thames Water’s investment strategy over the last decade. This 
article returns to the fundamental question of whether London ever needed a desalination 
plant in the first place. Deploying an urban political ecology approach, we demonstrate 
how the plant is simultaneously an iconic illustration of ecological modernization and a 
fragile example of an infrastructure-heavy solution to the demands of financialization. 
Understanding the development of the TWDP requires a focus on the scalar interactions 
between flows of finance, waste, energy and water that are woven through the hydrosocial 
cycle of London.
Introduction
In 2011 Thames Water began operating Britain’s first major experiment in 
desalination technology, the Thames Water Desalination Plant (TWDP). Requiring a 
budget of £270 million (Vidal, 2011; Thames Water, 2012), many initially viewed the 
plant as a costly, environmentally destructive, vanity project for Thames Water that 
would simply entrench wasteful water use when investments were urgently needed for 
upgrading a crumbling piped-water network across the city. However, in a remarkable 
turnaround, the plant is now viewed within the industry as a tremendous success, 
receiving several important accolades including an award for the ‘Most Sustainable 
Project’ in 2009 and ‘Desalination Plant of the Year’ in 2011, both presented by the pre-
stigious water consultancy Global Water Intelligence (Acciona Agua, 2014). The story 
behind this turnaround is fascinating. On the one hand, it is a classic tale of normative 
industrial ecology and ecological modernization, in which barriers become solutions and 
the challenges of sustainability are met with forward-thinking innovations combining 
profit making with green technologies. On the other hand, however, beneath industrial 
ecology’s alchemical tale, is a somewhat baser (albeit no less interesting) process. The 
TWDP can be seen to be utterly dependent on a byzantine financial model, which has 
shaped Thames Water’s investment strategy over the last decade or more. As Allen 
and Pryke (2013) refer to it––in a twist on Meek (2012)––Thames Water has become 
increasingly reliant on an investment model that turns households into human revenue 
streams. Investment decisions have come to be decided less by appropriate needs 
(and far less by concerns for some abstract notion of sustainability); instead, they have 
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focused on the most effective means to guarantee a range of investment opportunities 
within an increasingly leveraged set of infrastructural assets. The unfolding story of the 
Thames Tideway Tunnel, otherwise known as the ‘super sewer’, costing an estimated 
£4.2 billion (Griffiths, 2014), is likely to be a fascinating new chapter in this epic of our 
times. Beneath the glitter, and beneath the tales of alchemy, this article returns to the 
fundamental question of whether London ever needed a £270 million desalination plant 
in the first place. In so doing, we aim to contribute to the growing body of critical geo-
graphic scholarship on water infrastructure (e.g. Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012; McEvoy 
and Wilder, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2013; McDonnell, 2014) by highlighting the importance 
of financialization processes in producing and sustaining new infrastructural arrange-
ments (Loftus and March, 2015). In other words, we aim to shed light on the apparent 
return of big infrastructure under conditions of financialization.
Thames Water’s (2012) argument in favour of the TWDP is clear and simple: the 
population of London is expanding; rainfall levels are far lower than most people in 
the UK recognize; and climate is changing. All in all, Thames Water (ibid.) underscores 
that the capital is classed as ‘seriously water-stressed’ by the Environment Agency, 
which means that demand could outstrip supply if a sustained period of low rainfall 
occurs in the coming years. If the utility is not to over-exploit already stressed aquifers, 
alternative supplies will, Thames Water claims, have to increase. Desalination, which 
has been through a revolution in efficiency and a massive geographical expansion over 
the last two decades (March, 2015), is (according to this story) the most obvious solution 
to secure London’s supply without falling into the social and environmental problems 
associated with the twentieth century hydraulic paradigm (Saurí and del Moral, 2001). 
However, although Thames Water’s case for constructing the plant appears clear and 
simple, it cannot be separated from the recent prioritization of large infrastructure pro-
jects over more mundane strategies of demand management and leakage reduction. 
Thames Water is far from unique in changing its priorities: indeed, many now recognize 
that big water infrastructure is back. The seemingly unjustifiable expense of the 
project––an expense that is necessarily passed onto the consumer––needs to be situated 
within a growing appetite for large infrastructural projects, from dams to desalination 
plants and super-sewers. Concurring with Merme et al. (2014), we will argue that a 
radical shift in the financing model of water infrastructure must be seen as one of the 
key influences on this shifting model of provision.
The ‘household as human revenue stream’ story is one of several narratives that 
we wish to consider. Proudly boasting its deployment of the finest technologies, Thames 
Water has acquired a competitive advantage within what is now a lucrative market for 
desalination contracts around the world, contracts that it was estimated would be 
worth US $31 billion by 2015 and with a potential annual growth rate for capital 
expend iture of around 19% until 2025 (Gottelier, 2014). Intriguingly, however, the 
plant was not constructed by Thames Water; rather it was built by one of the largest 
Spanish infrastructure companies, Acciona, which has a prominent role in the Spanish 
desalination market (March et al., 2014). Thus, although symbolic capital is important, 
it doesn’t provide an adequate basis for explaining why the plant was constructed. We 
will therefore demonstrate that the Beckton desalination plant should be interpreted 
within a broader process of interlinking separate infrastructural networks around water, 
energy and wastewater (Chertow, 2000; Monstadt, 2009), and that these physical inter-
linkages are intrinsically bound up in the process of financializing water infrastructure 
and utilities. In short, the desalination plant’s physical and financial health depends on 
interlinking sectors that were formerly separate. Understanding the TWDP therefore 
requires focusing on the scalar interactions between finance, waste, energy and water 
that weave the hydrosocial cycle of London.1
1 The hydrosocial cycle encapsulates all the processes by which water becomes and reveals itself as a socio-nature 
(Linton and Budds, 2014).
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In what follows, we begin by considering literature on industrial ecology and 
urban metabolism before turning to financialization. Following this, we will provide a 
more detailed review of the recent development of water supply in London, focusing 
specifically on the TWDP. Subsequently, we will consider the complex infrastructural 
interlinkages within the wider Thames Gateway Water Treatment Works, looking at 
phys ical flows of water, energy and waste. We will then return to the financial model 
upon which these interconnections depend before concluding by bringing together the 
interlinking of infrastructure with a network of financial and political actors, extending 
from the human body to the commanding heights of the global economy. Interlinking 
urban infrastructure in the case of the Beckton plant is reliant upon and driven by a 
distinct shift in the system of accumulation of which infrastructure is a part.
Reworking urban metabolisms
The use of metabolism as metaphor and process has some of its deepest roots 
within Marxist approaches to socio-ecological relationships; however, this is certainly 
not the only area in which the concept has been advanced (Castán Broto et al., 2012; 
Newell and Cousins, 2015). In fact, at least five (often divergent) bodies of work can 
be viewed as key sources for research on metabolism in recent years: ecological eco n-
omics (e.g. Martínez-Alier, 2009); urban ecology (e.g. Grimm et al., 2000); urban polit-
ical ecology (e.g. Heynen et al., 2006); environmental sociology, through a focus on 
the metabolic rift (e.g. Foster, 2000); and industrial ecology (e.g. Kennedy et al., 2007). 
The latter uses principles from biological systems in order ‘to optimize the flows and 
transformations of materials and energy within and across the boundaries of industrial 
systems’ (Dunn and Steinemann, 1998: 661). Urban metabolism can thereby be defined 
as ‘the sum total of the technical and socio-economic processes that occurs in cities, 
resulting in growth, production of energy, and elimination of waste’ (Kennedy et al., 
2007: 44). The foundation of industrial ecology rests on modelling urban systems 
through natural systems in order to minimize demands on resources and sinks, and to 
increase efficiency. ‘Natural systems’, it is claimed, are cyclical and efficient, in con-
trast to urban systems which are deemed to be linear and less efficient in their use of 
physical natural flows, thus negatively affecting the natural systems upon which they 
survive, thereby generating both resources and sinks for the waste generated. In short, 
industrial ecology ‘seeks to better integrate industrial and municipal processes with each 
other, and with the natural system’ (Dunn and Steinemann, 1998: 663). At the method-
ological level, as Castán Broto et al. (2012: 853) claim, industrial ecology ‘has made 
major contributions to the methods for accounting for material and energy flows and 
the optimization of the “metabolism” of industrial systems through industrial symbiosis, 
whereby the waste output from one industry can become an input for another, providing 
both cost savings and environmental benefits’ (see also Dunn and Steinemann, 1998). 
One of the main contributions of industrial ecology is the accounting of flows of a 
given system under the label of material flow analysis (MFA), i.e. the quantification of 
physical flows for a given system, be it at national level or (more recently) urban level.
However, and notwithstanding the multi-scalar analyses of the complex web of 
relations across scales of physical resources that sustain the functioning of cities (see 
Kennedy et al., 2007), industrial ecology generally overlooks the complex scalar financial 
arrangements that sustain those metabolisms. As Castán Broto et al. (2012) highlight, 
the political and social drivers of material and energy flows are frequently ignored. 
Thus, a depoliticized account emerges, which naturalizes urban processes and situates 
the driver of change in technology rather than in politics. Absent is an anal ysis of how 
environmental change is influenced by the power relations and financial mechanisms 
that are unevenly distributed across scales, and which sustain these architectures. 
Against this backdrop, urban political ecology ‘challenges urban metabolism as a mere 
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process of biophysical exchange unrelated to social and historical context’ (ibid.: 857). 
In other words, urban political ecology helps to shed light on the linking of human 
bodies with infrastructural networks, as well as the financial networks that extract 
rent from urban metabolisms. Urban political ecology captures both the circulations 
of physical flows and their dialectical relations with financial flows and structures of 
power.
Different readings of metabolism can help to abstract different sets of processes 
from the concrete case of the TWDP and enable fundamentally different narratives 
to be constructed. In what follows, and after a succinct review of the literature on 
financialization plus a brief introduction to the TWDP charting its development from 
planning stage to completion, we will demonstrate how the desalination plant can be 
read as a success story of modern green engineering in which energy use has been 
localized; however, we will show how such a reading overlooks the fragile yet extensive 
financial and political networks on which the desalination plant (and the hydrosocial 
cycle of London) relies. It is this latter analysis that has the greatest bearing on 
future development of infrastructure projects in London and which should prompt 
a fundamental rethink of the construction of the Thames Tideway Tunnel in coming 
years.
Financialization
Although there is often disagreement about the precise meaning of the term 
financialization (see Lee et al., 2009), it is widely recognized that since the 1980s there 
has been an efflorescence of financial transactions and an apparent shift in the locus 
of profit making (Foster, 2007; Lapavitsas, 2014) which has encouraged a much more 
speculative form of capitalism, more dependent on rent extraction and less obviously 
tied to the creation of surplus value within the ‘real economy’. David Harvey (2005: 161) 
considers financialization to be one feature of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, writing 
that ‘deregulation allowed the financial system to become one of the main centres of 
redistributive activity through speculation, predation, fraud and thievery’. Earlier, in 
The Condition of Postmodernity, Harvey (1989: 196) noted that ‘if we are to look for 
anything truly distinctive (as opposed to “capitalism as usual”) in the present situation, 
then it is upon the financial aspects of capitalist organization and on the role of credit 
that we should concentrate our gaze’. Reflecting the growth in these financial aspects of 
capitalist organization, Aalbers (2008) has demonstrated the profoundly geographical 
features of the financial crisis, as well as the role of mortgage markets in shaping the 
crisis (Aalbers, 2011). Christophers (2013) has sought to ‘place finance in global capi-
talism’ through his research on the geographies of banking practices, while more 
recently (Christophers, 2014; 2015) reviewing the state of the art on the geographies of 
finance. Meanwhile a growing body of work has emphasized the profound shifts taking 
place within both public service provision and also relations with ‘nature’ (Loftus and 
March, 2015). Thus, finance has been seen to play an increasingly important role in how 
people access basic resources such as water, and in both environmental governance 
and the production of historically and geographically specific natures (Labban, 2010; 
Sullivan, 2013; March and Purcell, 2014). 
On the role of financialization in the water sector, March and Purcell (2014) 
have focused on the complicated role of finance in shaping the recent investment 
decisions of Aguas de Barcelona, whereas Allen and Pryke (2013) have focused on the 
‘financialisation of household water’ in the case of Thames Water. Bayliss (2014; 2015) 
has provided a more detailed study of the role played by financialization in relation to 
a range of different water and sewerage companies in England and Wales. Applying the 
systems of provision approach to the water sector in England and Wales, Bayliss (2015) 
notes that water quality and quantity has improved since privatization in 1989; however, 
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she argues that such improvements have come about through a massive increase in 
consumer bills. Over the last decade, the impact of these rising bills has been exacerbated 
by a fall in wages. Although capital spending on infrastructure has increased in several 
instances, this spending cannot explain the rise in bills. Instead, rising bills are related to 
failures in the regulatory process (the 2009 price review failed to forecast sustained low 
interest rates) and reflect the demands of the increasingly geared utilities. Incredibly 
complex corporate structures enable debt to be packaged and sold on to different parts 
of the same utility, maximizing profits while minimizing the corporation tax payable. 
In particular the creation of special purpose vehicles, through the establishment of 
offshore companies in the Cayman Islands, has enabled the debt used in the purchase of 
a utility to be offloaded onto the utility itself. Increasing debt has been used to finance 
shareholder dividends (Allen and Pryke, 2013), which leads to an overall decline in 
equity. Thames Water’s decisions whether or not to invest in individual infrastructure 
projects cannot be divorced from this broader context, as we will argue later in the 
article. Indeed, we will show that it has had a profound influence on the need for such 
plants as the TWDP. However, in developing this argument we wish first to consider 
the narratives of success that show a profound localization of the inputs on which the 
hydrosocial cycle of London depends.
Engineering the sustainable ideal
The TWDP is generally considered to be the UK’s first serious experiment in 
large-scale desalination (Acciona Agua, 2014). Its construction began in 2008 after initial 
planning objections from the mayor, Ken Livingstone (supported by broader public 
opinion), were finally overcome. Although the national government had approved the 
construction of the facility, Livingstone mounted a legal challenge to reverse planning 
permissions for the desalination plant. It took a change of mayor before the plant was 
finally approved in 2008 (Greater London Authority, 2007; BBC, 2010). The planning 
review of the facility in 2005 cited the strategic objectives of the London Plan (Greater 
London Authority, 2004) as the basis for opposition. Challenging supply-oriented per-
spectives (while not ignoring calls to expand water infrastructure), the London Plan 
advocates greater emphasis to be placed on leakage reduction and demand management, 
minimizing the use of treated water, stressing instead the need to maximize rainwater-
harvesting opportunities and prioritize greywater recycling systems. Livingstone had 
personally questioned Thames Water’s claim that there was a genuine shortfall in 
supply and that the facility would be needed in response to this. As the Financial Times 
reported: ‘The mayor has refused permission for the plant, claiming it was unnecessary 
to build an “energy and carbon guzzling” plant on protected land when the company was 
leaking 915m litres of clean water a day from its pipes’ (Sherwood, 2006). Both leakage 
prevention and demand management were emphasized as necessary alternatives by the 
mayor, as opposed to costly new technologies (Greater London Authority, 2007). Thames 
Water rejected such a position, claiming that the disruption caused by an overhaul of 
leakage reduction would outweigh the benefits, a claim rebutted by Livingstone who 
suggested that the company was frightened of upsetting its automobile-dependent 
customers for whom there would be inevitable disruption if more fundamental repairs 
of the piped network were initiated (Sherwood, 2006). Thames Water then went on 
to claim that, against the backdrop of drier and hotter summers, London’s population 
would rise by 700,000 by 2021 (Vidal, 2011; Thames Water, 2012), leading to an increase 
in consumption by both households and businesses. In the 2005 planning report, it 
is noted that Thames Water Utilities Limited had identified ‘a gap of some 150 mega 
litres per day (150 ML/d) between the demand and actual supply of water, even after 
potential savings from leakage are taken into account’ (Mayor of London, 2005: 5, 
emphasis added). Indeed, the utility appeared convinced that metropolitan London 
would face ‘a high risk of severe water shortages’ (Jowit, 2010). The figure of 150 ML/d 
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conveniently matched the planned output of the new facility, which Thames Water 
(2012) concluded would be ‘available to help provide the capital’s supplies for the 
future––whatever the weather’.
Beyond the contrasting visions of supply-side solutions (Thames Water) versus 
demand management (Ken Livingstone and the Greater London Authority), the main 
sticking point in the original negotiations remained the ‘energy and carbon guzzling’ 
(as Livingstone described it) nature of the development. Thames Water initially sub-
mitted estimates of the energy usage of the facility that appeared to further undermine 
the ambitions of the London Plan (Greater London Authority, 2004), which sought to 
increase the share of the city’s energy demands covered by renewable sources. In the 
original application, Thames Water ruled out the construction of an on-site facility, as 
well as the use of photovoltaic energy, concluding that the only source of renewable 
energy on site would be wind (Mayor of London, 2005: 10). The 2005 planning report 
therefore concluded ‘[t]hat Newham Council be advised that for reasons set out in the 
body of this report, the latest application provides no additional proposals to deliver a 
sustainable and efficient management of water supply in London and is contrary to the 
interests of good strategic planning in London’ (ibid.: 1). Linking water and energy in 
a more virtuous cycle became increasingly important, not only so that Thames Water 
could confront the arguments of its opponents within the Greater London Authority 
but also for the obvious reason that it would enable the utility to reduce production 
costs.
Thames Water’s strategy in response to these challenges has been multi-pronged. 
First, the utility vowed to source all its energy needs from locally sourced biofuels (BBC, 
2010), thereby dramatically reducing its overall demand for non-renewable energies 
and localizing the source of energy. Secondly, and more recently, an energy start-up––
Beckton Combined Heat and intelligent Power (CHiP)––has located adjacent to the 
TWDP (2OC, 2013; Thames Water, 2013a). This new entity sells energy to Thames 
Water, generated from the fat that would otherwise have caused costly blockages (or 
‘fatbergs’) within London’s sewerage network. Finally, in anticipation that a further 
major infrastructural expansion (the Thames Tideway Tunnel) will get the go-ahead, 
Thames Water has embarked on a further expansion of the Beckton site, constructing 
a wind turbine generating 8% of the energy needs of the plant, as well as a thermal 
hydrolysis plant (THP) in which solid waste will be heated to 160 degrees Celsius, ena-
bling biogas energy to contribute further to the required supply (Thames Water, 2013b; 
2013c). In resolving such difficulties through a focus on the water–energy nexus (i.e. 
the increasingly interlinked nature of water and energy), Thames Water is now able to 
claim it is the largest green energy self-generator within the M25 (the motorway that 
encircles Greater London), producing in excess of 15% of its own energy and able to use 
the power generated from its own treatment process to drive the plant itself (Freyberg, 
2012). 
Before considering the differing ways of interpreting the TWDP, it is important 
to note the choice of location for the desalination plant, given that Beckton will even-
tually form a central part of the next phase of development in Thames Water’s mega-
infrastructure plan. Lying on a tidal stretch of the Thames estuary, the TWDP is able 
to abstract brackish water from the river ensuring a lower salt concentration––the 
variation in salt content of the water flowing up and down the Thames fluctuates 
between 0.08 parts per thousand (0.008% ppt) and 2.35 parts per thousand (0.235% 
ppt) (Lane et al., 2007). The brackish water then passes through a pre-treatment facility 
before undergoing the main filtration and reverse osmosis process in which pre-treated 
water is forced through a four-stage process, with a conversion rate of 84% (Acciona 
Agua, 2014). Desalted water undergoes a remineralization process before being 
pumped to the Woodford Reservoir, nine miles northwest of Beckton. It can then enter 
the piped network following further treatment. Back at Beckton, waste products (mostly 
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hyper-saline water) can then be mixed with treated sewage effluent before being 
pumped into the Thames.
In addition to being found on the tidal reaches of the Thames, the TWDP is 
located within London’s largest wastewater treatment site and one of the largest sewage 
treatment plants in Europe. Treating the waste of over 3.5 million customers, the 
Beckton Sewage Treatment Works covers a large expanse of land just over a mile down-
stream from the Thames Barrier (Thames Water, 2012). The site is central to London’s 
wastewater operations as, first, the Lee Tunnel stormwater overflow and, subsequently, 
the Thames Tideway Tunnel will deposit far greater volumes of wastewater at this 
single site. In order to cope with this additional wastewater, a 60% increase in the 
capacity of the site is anticipated by 2021 (ibid.). Whereas the desalination plant marked 
the crossing of one Rubicon in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the latest––
and far larger––challenge confronting Thames Water and its customers concerns plans 
for the £4.2 billion Thames Tideway Tunnel (Griffiths, 2014). With a proposed annual 
increase in customer bills of around £80–100 (in addition to bill increases resulting 
from the TWDP) the plans for this new ‘super sewer’ were originally referred to 
OFWAT, the economic regulator of the water sector, and relied on planning permission 
being granted by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, only clearing these final hurdles 
in September 2014 (BBC, 2014). Importantly, the project assessor, Chris Binnie, who 
had supported the scheme a decade earlier, recently branded it a stupendous waste 
of taxpayers’ money (ibid.). Binnie concluded (in rather similar terms to those with 
which we began this article) by stating: ‘I do not know why there is such a bandwagon 
rolling’ (ibid.). The answer, we would suggest, may well lie in the financialization of 
infrastructure, of which both the super sewer and the TWDP are crucial examples. Prior 
to being given the go-ahead for the super sewer, Thames Water established yet another 
tier to its multi-level ‘wedding cake structure’ (see Allen and Pryke, 2013) in order to 
raise capital to be able to finance the construction of the scheme. Unsurprisingly, given 
that the main focus of the Beckton site has been on wastewater treatment, and that 
the ‘super sewer’ will now provide an even greater volume of wastewater at the site, 
there is speculation as to whether or not the desalination plant will eventually purify 
treated wastewater to the level at which it could circulate within the potable water 
network. Whether this speculation is justified or not, it is clear that Beckton is the 
perfect location for formerly separate sectors of the urban infrastructural system to 
begin to integrate more closely. In the sections of the article that follow, we narrate the 
tale of London’s desalination saga through the lens of industrial ecology before turning 
to urban political ecology in order to understand the plant as both iconic exemplar of 
ecological modernization and as a fragile example of an infrastructure-heavy solution 
to capital’s increasing need for speculative gains.
Archetypal industrial ecology
‘In London … they can do nothing better with the excrement produced by 4 1/2 
million people than pollute the Thames with it, at monstrous expense.’
Marx (1981: 195)
Writing over 150 years ago, Marx noted the rupture in ecological systems 
manifest in the process of urbanization. The metabolic rift, as Foster (1999) would later 
term it, resulted in human waste being thrown into watercourses, rather than being 
returned to the soil as was the custom prior to urbanization. Intriguingly, with recent 
advances in tertiary treatment systems, new wastewater treatment technologies would 
appear to engineer a solution to the rupture in ecological systems underscored by Marx. 
Utilities are now able to reuse part of the sludge derived from wastewater treatment 
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plants as a fertilizer and soil conditioner for agricultural land (thanks to its richness in 
organic matter, trace elements and nutrients). Nevertheless, if one metabolic rift has 
been mitigated, concerns over the energy demands needed to sustain the urban water 
cycle remain. Along these lines, recent debates on water management have highlighted 
the crucial need to take the water–energy nexus into account when planning for further 
water infrastructure devel opment (see e.g. Siddiqui and Diaz Anadon, 2011). McDonnell 
(2014) presents, in that sense, a very detailed narration of how, in countries such as the 
United Arab Emirates, it is impossible to understand the huge changes in the landscape 
brought about by desalination if its integration with the energy sector is not taken into 
account. The massive development of desalination plants in water-stressed countries 
and the proliferation of energy-intensive water and wastewater treatments have put 
energy requirements into the spotlight (March, 2015). Indeed, the main criticisms of 
desalination technologies remain focused on the high energy consumption required 
and the greenhouse emissions released if this energy does not come from renewable 
sources (see e.g. Meerganz von Medeazza, 2004; Sadhwani et al., 2005; McEvoy and 
Wilder, 2012). This has resulted in some scholars qualifying desalination as an example 
of ‘maladaptation’ (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). Ken Livingstone was clearly onto 
something.
Albeit indirectly, the infrastructure that now comprises the Beckon site (which 
includes the TWDP) has responded to the nineteenth century debates on the metabolic 
rift, as well as directly engaging in twenty-first century debates on the water–energy 
nexus. The resulting infrastructural fix captures the normative essence of industrial 
eco logy and its visions of urban metabolism through a revolutionary solution that over-
comes London’s water supply problems, avoids ‘fatbergs’ in the sewerage system and 
contributes to the making of London as a low-carbon city. Thus, in Figure 1 we can 
observe the interlinking of different infrastructures and physical flows that enable 
London’s water supply system to function during periods of drought, as well as treated 
CITY OF LONDON
BECKTON
Wastewater
treatment
plant
CHiP
Desalination
plant
Wastewater
(litres)
Brackish water
(litres)
Households
Businesses
Thames
river
Treated
wastewater
Drinking water
Energy
(KwH)
FOGs
(calories)
figure 1 Schema of the flows involved in the production of desalted water and the 
treatment of wastewater at the Beckton site (authors’ own elaboration)
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wastewater ready to be discarded safely to the River Thames. The project of the Beckton 
CHiP (2OC, 2013; Thames Water, 2013a) and the agreement with Thames Water to use 
recovered fats, oils and greases (FOGs) to supply over half of the energy needs for the 
desalination and wastewater treatment plants represents a further step. Not only does 
this enable the integration of two different utilities (water and energy) but it also means 
that energy production can be downscaled to the local sphere, as the fuel would be 
partly obtained from restaurants and food outlets within the limits of the city.
As has been argued, Beckton is the perfect location for assembling these formerly 
separate networks and encapsulates the ideal of infrastructural integration, enabling 
the claim that this is a win-win solution for the different economic actors as well as for 
Londoners. The new integrated infrastructural ideal is framed within an apparent shift 
towards a more sustainable and low-carbon city in which energy and clean water (either 
for drinking purposes or for pumping back into the river) can be produced using a 
variety of renewables, including among those energy sources local fat that was formerly 
a major cost for Thames Water (through clearing of blocked sewers). Such alchemy 
has been widely celebrated by the managers of the companies involved in the project 
for two primary reasons. On the one hand, the integrated ideal is celebrated as a down-
scaling of socio-environmental relations: in this account both water and energy can 
be provided locally. On the other hand, the integrated ideal transforms a risk and a 
nuisance (fat) into a valuable resource. In an archetypal urban ecological case study, 
the problem becomes the solution. Along those lines, the CEO of 2OC, the company 
designing and managing the CHiP plant, argued the project is ‘good for us, Thames 
Water and its customers and the environment. Renewable power and heat sourced in 
London, generated in London and used in London’ (Thames Water, 2013a).
Both 2OC and Thames Water evoke and fetishize the local scale, and the 
commercial director for Thames Water can argue that the project is a win-win solution 
for the manner in which it provides ‘[r]enewable power for two of our critical services 
and a means of tackling the ongoing operational problem of so-called “fatbergs” 
which are responsible for over 40,000 blockages a year in our sewage network’ (ibid.). 
Although such a narrative can easily be interpreted through debates over de-politicized 
environmental technocratic management (March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014), more 
importantly, claims of the universal benefits of the physical symbioses outlined above 
serve to deflect attention from crucial questions as to: (1) whether the infrastructural 
developments are necessary in the first place; and (2) who will pay for them if they are 
constructed. Claims that the plant is urgently needed can, we would argue, be treated 
with a degree of scepticism when alternatives received such short shrift, and when a 
considerable degree of uncertainty remains over London’s potential future water needs. 
In spite of the fact that the plant is only to function as a back-up solution in periods 
of severe and prolonged stress (Vidal, 2011), a further desalination plant is being con-
sidered for the south bank of the Thames estuary (Thames Water, 2014). To return to 
the question of who will pay for the return of big infrastructure, however, requires a 
new level of abstraction. Here we need to look a little further into the complex financial 
arrangements under which Thames Water now operates.
Financializing infrastructure
As we have sought to emphasize, the story narrated above––one that is pushed 
heavily by Thames Water, 2OC and their investors––could easily be included in the 
many handbooks of industrial ecology. This tale is one of increasing localization, 
the development of a circular economy and the realization of urban sustainability. 
The environmental hinterland from which water and energy resources have been drawn 
is shown to gradually decrease, generating a virtuous cycle of inter-sector linkages at an 
altogether more rational ecological scale. Beckton becomes the crucial location where 
such infrastructures can be interlinked and at which this localization is made possible. 
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In a strange paradox, the continued opposition to the Beckton plant from the leader 
of the Green Party in the Greater London Assembly appears to hold back the environ-
mental progress being made by debt-leveraged financial entities. Financiers, not green 
politicians, apparently have the solutions to what once appeared intractable environ-
mental problems.
However, the financial model upon which Thames Water and the other players 
in the Beckton narrative is built moves in the opposite direction to this alchemical tale 
of localization. Through tracing this financial model, we see the contradictions upon 
which any claims to a green solution clearly falter. Within the financial model, one 
witnesses a process of internationalization, which is dependent on local consumers 
paying increased tariffs within a tightly regulated sector operating within national 
boundaries. Torrance (2008) alludes to the seemingly contradictory scalar tendencies 
within the production of financialized infrastructure, demonstrating that it relies on a 
model of glocal governance in which financial instruments become increasingly glo-
balized, at the same time as the returns, which are guaranteed from the infrastructure, 
are themselves increasingly dependent on local regulatory mechanisms. Thus, in the 
case of water in England and Wales, OFWAT continues to set the inflation-linked model 
of tariffs. At the same time, teachers’ pensions in Ontario as well as the sovereign 
wealth funds of Abu Dhabi and China rely on a steady rate of returns, which can only be 
increased through opening up new sectors for profitable investment such as London’s 
infrastructure (see also Allen and Pryke, 2013). If this glocalization emerges in relation 
to new forms of regulation, it also needs to be understood alongside the production of 
new urban natures and the historically and geographically specific practices––such as 
the building of infrastructure––upon which scale is produced.
Torrance (2008; 2009) elaborates on the argument that infrastructure has 
become increasingly financialized, demonstrating that roads, pipes, airports and electri-
city networks all provide a relatively secure and safe set of returns for the investor who 
is less interested in risk taking. Sovereign wealth funds and pension schemes have been 
drawn to such investments because of the security offered and the length of time over 
which they will mature. In the case of England and Wales, investing in water utilities 
provides an additional inflation-linked guarantee of steady returns. Nevertheless, 
Torrance notes a shift in the manner in which the low-risk model operates and points 
to the emergence of an ‘Australian finance model’, pioneered by Macquarie Bank, and 
rolled out in the 2000s. As she goes on to write: ‘Assuming that debt is available at 
an attractive rate, many in the infrastructure sector leverage their investments with 
a high level of debt, greatly increasing equity returns but making the investments 
financially riskier. The rationale for investing in infrastructure is diluted in such a case, 
since infrastructure assets become less stable and riskier due to the increased financial 
risk’ (Torrance, 2009: 82). This new model increasingly relies on relatively low rates 
of inflation and interest, which have become far more prevalent among the economies 
of the global North since Torrance was writing, indeed the norm for the last decade or 
more. This new finance model has its roots in the early 1980s, when private investors 
began acquiring equity in Australian roads (ibid.: 81). With the wave of privatizations 
that occurred in many states during the 1980s and 1990s, Macquarie Group was 
well placed to manage investment portfolios in infrastructure, while simultaneously 
becoming one of the sector’s principal investors in its own right. This is the background 
to Macquarie Group’s acquisition of Thames Water in 2006 from the German engi-
neering and utility giant RWE. With Macquarie Group’s purchase, Allen and Pryke 
(2013: 419) write that:
Thames Water’s households became central to a model of financialised 
infrastructure that is as far removed from the idea of shareholder capitalism 
that drove the early privatisations of British Telecom and gas as it is from the 
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notion that individuals have progressively been turned into financial subjects … 
Rather it is a model where it would seem that the households themselves are 
the financial asset, a ‘human revenue stream’ as Meek (2012) expressed it, one 
which has been packaged and sold to global investors through the techniques 
and practices of financialisation.
Allen and Pryke (ibid.) therefore provide a rigorous case study of the model of debt 
refinancing that Torrance (2008; 2009) had earlier alluded to and is detailed by Bayliss 
(2014; 2015) and March and Purcell (2014). The financial structure of the Thames Water 
group now resembles a ‘wedding cake’ in which Thames Water is owned by Kemble 
Water Limited, which itself is owned by Kemble Water Holdings Limited (the creation 
of a special purpose vehicle, a crucial part of the new financing model emphasized by 
Bayliss, 2015, means that Thames Water Cayman Finance Limited is one of the two 
buttresses for this model). A consortium of international investors, of which the largest 
is Macquarie Group, owns Kemble Water Holdings Limited. Other investors include 
a variety of pension funds from Canada, Australia, Spain and the Netherlands. More 
recently, in December 2011, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority bought a 9.9% stake, 
followed soon after by the China Investment Corporation (also a sovereign wealth 
fund) which acquired an 8.68% stake in January 2012. When British Telecom’s pension 
scheme acquired a 13% stake, Macquarie Group’s overall share in Kemble Water 
Holdings Limited was reduced to 26% (Allen and Pryke, 2013). Within this structure, 
the dual role of Macquarie Group is intriguing: it combines an ability to craft financial 
packages based on securitized assets that might be attractive to its clients, while also 
being able to channel funds to Kemble Water Holdings Limited. As Allen and Pryke 
(ibid.: 426) write, the group ‘is able to generate their own income stream from investors 
worldwide, while the Kemble Consortium as a whole, in turn, derives benefit from the 
financial products engineered by Macquarie to capture the revenue streams generated 
by Thames Water’s households’.
Over the last decade and a half, new financial mechanisms have enabled infra-
structure to be enrolled within a capitalist system of accumulation in ways clearly not 
envisaged in the early years of privatization. Indeed, infrastructure has become one of 
the crucial sites for mopping up over-accumulated capital within the global economy 
over the last two decades (Torrance, 2009). In this regard, the claim that finance would 
become crucial to the manner in which capital can flow through fixed infrastructure 
was foreseen in Harvey’s (1982) Limits to Capital. As Harvey wrote back then, a well-
developed financial system enables capital to switch effortlessly between sectors of the 
economy in search of the highest rates of profit. With growing crises initiated by a falling 
rate of profit and growing evidence of over-accumulation, it thereby became possible 
to switch capital from a primary to a secondary circuit, a process that Harvey initially 
interpreted through Lefebvre’s theses on the rise of urbanization (Harvey, 1978). In 
infrastructural investments, capital is able to find precisely the kind of temporal fix 
sought (an investment that delivers returns over a much longer period of time, while 
also temporarily ‘fixing’ key aspects of the crisis of over-accumulation) by diverting 
it away from forms of direct production. With the globalization of such a system, a 
temporal fix can work simultaneously across geographical space, enabling a shift of 
capital from one area of the globe to another. Although Castree and Christophers (2015) 
see some positive aspects to an emerging socio-ecological fix, as finance can provide 
the resource for sustainable transformations, it can also be seen as part of an ongoing 
process of accumulation by dispossession in which ecologies are produced out of an 
increasingly risky, heavily leveraged and fundamentally undemocratic financial model. 
Thames Water’s financial model therefore represents a new manifestation of, indeed 
a step-change in, what Swyngedouw (2005) refers to as the transformation of local 
waters into global money.
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The political implications of such a shift are many. Allen and Pryke (2013) point 
to the development of a model geared more towards providing benefits to investors than 
consumers, and one that increasingly loses sight of the needs of consumers. Through 
OFWAT’s tight regulation of the water sector in England and Wales, a form of ‘ring-
fenced politics’ has emerged which is dominated by a narrow technocratic reading of 
perceived gains for all. Again, the alchemy provided by a win-win situation in which 
environmental gains are made through the foresight of enlightened financial entities 
that can guarantee secure returns for their investors is almost impossible to criticize. 
In the process, however, the political comes to be sutured by the ongoing practice of a 
post-politics. Nonetheless, if this post-politicization and the new financial model are 
crucial parts of the story of glocalization in the post-political regulation of water utili-
ties in England and Wales, they do not comprise the complete story. In a final twist to 
the vexing question of why Thames Water chose to build the TWDP in a city such as 
London, we need to turn to the relationship with emerging Spanish actors in order to 
understand how both infrastructural connections and financial connections have been 
facilitated by the TWDP’s internal relationship with Spain. This final chapter in our 
narrative takes us far away from the blithe tales of technological prowess circulated 
by Thames Water and industrial ecologists. Instead, it necessitates a further level of 
abstraction, focusing (perhaps surprisingly) on the domestic politics of Spain, bound 
up as this politics is in the efforts to engineer a hydrosocial landscape that balances the 
demands of different interest groups (Swyngedouw, 2015). To begin this chapter, we 
need to first hone in on the impact of financialization upon the operation of Spanish 
water operators and the emergence of Acciona as one of the crucial actors in the 
development of the TWDP against the backdrop of a Spanish desalination boom.
March and Purcell (2014) demonstrate how, just as French utilities were well 
placed to benefit from the water privatizations of the 1990s, the water providers of 
several large Spanish cities such as Barcelona were able to bid for new concession con-
tracts as they appeared across the global North and South. This competitive advantage 
was most clearly visible in a Latin American context, where other newly privatized 
Spanish firms such as Telefónica were proving highly successful. To cite the example 
drawn on by March and Purcell (ibid.), AGBAR (Sociedad General de Aguas de Barce-
lona) was part of a successful bid for the concession contract to operate the Buenos 
Aires municipal water network in 1993, in a consortium comprising several interna-
tional companies. However, AGBAR’s investment model began to shift after the 
collapse of the Buenos Aires concession. Intriguingly, the utility increasingly took 
on some of the characteristics of the Australian model. Thus, only five years after 
acquiring Bristol Water, AGBAR sold its majority stake in the former to the Canadian 
global infrastructure fund Capstone. Only a few months after this sale, Capstone sold 
20% to the Japanese company Itochu. In a further twist, Capstone’s debt was initially 
brokered by Macquarie Group and a major increase in the interest payments was built 
into the original agreement. Thus, although apparently benign, one can begin to see 
how the risks entailed in the so-called Australian model have enormous implications 
for the way in which infrastructure that is geographically rooted in the UK comes to 
circulate as a financial asset and is ‘flipped’ by different globalized funds. As March and 
Purcell (2014: 17) write: ‘Capstone’s actions shine a light on the … risks of financialisation 
in the water sector: when the asset’s yield drops below its price (cost+interest) it 
reveals fictitious capital for what it is––the speculative claim upon future profits’. 
Increasingly frequent changes of ownership characterize the need to maximize––and 
cash in on––these speculative gains. Speculation therefore extends well beyond the 
projected returns on a tightly regulated water market within a given infrastructure 
network; it also captures the expected returns on future infrastructural developments, 
which is where the expectations of profits to be gained from increasingly interlinked 
infrastructures, across different sectors, begin to emerge. The TWDP is not only linked 
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to Barcelona through Macquarie’s broking role. More importantly, the entire regional 
raw-water supplier ATLL (including Barcelona’s desalination plant) was leased in 2012 
to an international consortium led by the same Spanish infrastructure company, Acciona, 
that constructed the TWDP (at the time of writing the adjudication of ATLL’s lease was 
before the courts, with the final decision uncertain). Thus, Acciona’s technologies and 
scientific expertise were put to work in London, at the same time as a financialized 
model of water provision––in which Thames Water is surely at the apex––can be seen 
to have been transported from Australia to Barcelona via London.
Each of these financial and infrastructural actors clearly operates within dif-
fering, although increasingly interlinked, regulatory contexts. Crucially, the opening 
up of different sectors of the economy, forms of infrastructure and aspects of service 
provision relies on political decisions made at a range of scales. The implications of the 
Thatcher administration’s decision to fully divest water infrastructure in England and 
Wales were thus enormous, not only for the provision of water in those two countries, 
but also for water services in cities as disparate as Buenos Aires, Manila, Jakarta or 
Durban. Furthermore, decisions made in Spain over the last decade have profoundly 
shaped the economics of desalination around the world. Although the specifics of 
these shifts are dealt with in greater detail elsewhere, it is important to note that the 
Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE) gained power in the 2004 elections on a platform of 
abandoning the Partido Popular’s (PP) pursuit of an inter-basin transfer from the River 
Ebro. Desalination, under the so-called AGUA programme, offered a solution to the 
problem the new government faced over the potential shortfall in water resources. 
Desalination also provided the PSOE administration with an opportunity to champion 
an emerging sector of the Spanish economy and for companies to put to work the 
over-accumulated capital then washing about within the Spanish economy. On the 
basis of this technonatural fix, as Swyngedouw (2013; 2015) has referred to it, Spanish 
companies could therefore become leaders in desalination technology and their 
expertise could be exported around the world (March et al., 2014; March, 2015). This 
process has accelerated since the early 2000s, even though desalination was not viewed 
with the same enthusiasm by the ensuing PP administration (with water transfers 
being restored as a political objective). Looking at the historical geographies of the 
development of desalination in London, we therefore need to situate it within political 
decision-making in the UK as well as in Spain and Australia. A Spanish infrastructure 
company therefore became the main actor in the construction of a desalination plant 
for an increasingly globalized financial entity comprising investors from Australia, 
Canada, Abu Dhabi and China, albeit one seemingly localized––in name and location––
on the River Thames. The desalination plant internalizes the changing relations of 
global infrastructure provision. Any genuinely adequate narrative must therefore 
go well beyond Beckton, the River Thames and London to encompass the changing 
ownership of roads in Australia, the election of the PSOE in Spain, the unionization of 
teachers in Ontario and, more recently, the deployment of government grants in the UK 
for renewable energy transitions.
Conclusion
In concluding, we would like to return to the question with which we began: 
why build a desalination plant in London? On the one hand, if we accept the testimony 
of Thames Water, the answer is simple. Population demands, a changing climate and 
low rainfall place enormous pressures on a water network that dates back to the 
Victorian era. However, such a response fails to address the question as to why such 
a large energy-intensive infrastructural project provides the best solution to the water 
needs of London. Why not invest money in renewing meters, fixing leaks, rainwater 
harvesting, educational campaigns and so on? A complementary justification can be 
found if the project is interpreted through the lens of industrial ecology. Industrial 
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ecology’s narrative points less to the needs of Londoners and more to the ecological 
benefits to be gained from interlinking infrastructural sectors that had previously been 
separated. The problem around the intensification of the water–energy nexus brought 
about by the desalination plant is inverted. Indeed, through overcoming the initial chal-
lenges of building a plant that localizes energy needs, a virtuous solution has emerged 
in which the initial problem becomes the solution. Thus, Thames Water would appear 
to have responded to its critics by developing a single site within which wastewater 
can be transformed into clean drinking water thanks to the fat which prevents the 
flow of wastewater. The metabolic rift, that so concerned Marx, has been challenged 
through the linking of water and energy in a virtuous cycle. As several key players have 
pointed out, this provides a win-win situation in which the environmental footprint of 
the plant is gradually reduced. The TWDP would appear to represent a zenith in the 
technical skills of a company committed to the principles of ecological modernization 
and integrating infrastructural solutions across sectors.
Nevertheless, this response similarly fails to answer the question of why the 
desalination plant was built: it is simply inadequate to say it was built because it could 
be built in a more sustainable way. In the course of this article we have constructed a 
fundamentally different answer that we hope demonstrates the agility of urban political 
ecology frameworks in theorizing the latest shifts in infrastructure provision. Although 
recently coming under fire for a ‘methodological cityism’ (Angelo and Wachsmuth, 
2015) urban political ecology has never been constrained by the urban form but has, 
rather, developed an approach that always moves beyond the local to understand the 
broader ensemble of socio-ecological relations out of which specific urban forms are 
produced. Using the example of the TWDP––one infrastructural form––we have sought 
to understand the broader sets of relations that constitute a fundamental shift in the 
provision of services and the make-up of infrastructure in contemporary capitalist 
societies. We cannot overestimate the importance of this shift towards financialized 
infrastructure, which constitutes a fundamentally different relationship between 
citizen and state, and between resources and everyday life. Developing such an analysis, 
we located the symbolic capital acquired by Thames Water in the competitive bidding 
for new concession contracts. However, more fundamentally, we pointed to a financial 
model that moves in precisely the opposite direction from the localization of the 
resource base celebrated in the alchemical narrative of the TWDP. Through heavily 
leveraging infrastructural assets, Macquarie Group (Thames Water’s principal owner) 
has been able to maximize returns for overseas investors. Just as Spanish companies 
have benefited from the boost given by national government to desalination, so they 
have been able to expand into other parts of the globe. Speculative capital now stalks the 
globe in search of new sources for profitable investment: the entire Thames Gateway 
Water Treatment Works has been enrolled in a financialized system of accumulation 
that seemingly subjugates sustainable transformations to the enlargement of the process 
of accumulation through the deployment of state-of-the art green technologies and a 
heavily leveraged financial model. Paradoxically, the result has been the construction 
of a desalination facility that, in spite of all its technical superiority, was far from the 
most pressing need of London’s hydrosocial cycle and will be paid for by households 
that are increasingly treated as sources from which further rents can be (locally) 
extracted and (globally) circulated and appropriated. For households in London, the 
result has been, and will continue to be, a rise in tariffs in spite of the tight regulation 
enacted by OFWAT. For those elsewhere in the world it may well be a rise in enclaves 
of premium service provision as highlighted in Boland (2007) and a further isolation of 
the archipelagos that Bakker (2003) saw emerging alongside privatization in the global 
South. Nevertheless, if the privatization process has been the key structuring argument 
in critical scholarship on (water) utilities and infrastructure over the last quarter of 
a century, we argue that the focus of attention needs to shift to financialization in 
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order to understand the scalar and uneven production of infrastructure in the twenty-
first century. As Aalbers (2015) recently noted, it is critical to understand how the 
financialization of the global economy is linked with the financialization of the state, 
different economic sectors, companies and daily life. Infrastructure cuts across these 
spheres and emerges as a privileged object through which to scrutinize the typically 
opaque processes of financialization.
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